Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Fundamental ontology: Fundamental ontology is a branch of philosophy that investigates the most basic and fundamental aspects of being, like the question What is the nature of being? Fundamental ontology is often contrasted with ontic ontology, which is concerned with the specific types of beings that exist. For example, ontic ontology might investigate the nature of physical objects, mental states, or social entities. See also Ontology, Existence, Essence, Being._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Martin Heidegger on Fundamental Ontology - Dictionary of Arguments
Gadamer I 259 Fundamental Ontology/Heidegger/Gadamer: Under the keyword of a "hermeneutics of facticity" Heidegger opposed Husserl's eidetic phenomenology and the distinction between fact and being on which it was based with a paradoxical demand. Cf. >Life/Husserl. Heidegger: The unjustifiable and inferable factuality of "Dasein", the existence, and not the pure cogito as a constitution of essence of typical generality, should be the ontological basis of the phenomenological question (...). Gadamer I 261 Gadamer: The problem of factuality was after all also the core problem of historicism - at least in the form of the critique of Hegel's dialectical precondition of "reason in history". So it was clear that Heidegger's draft of a fundamental ontology had to put the problem of history in the foreground. But it was soon to become apparent that it was not the solution of the problem of historism, that no more original foundation of the sciences at all, and indeed not, as with Husserl, a last-radical self-justification of philosophy that made up the meaning of this fundamental ontology, but that the idea of justification itself underwent a complete reversal. >E. Husserl, >Science, >Ontology. HeideggerVsHusserl: It was no longer the same what it was with Husserl when Heidegger undertook to interpret "being", "truth" and "history" from the absolute temporality. For this temporality was not that of the "or" of the transcendental primal ego. Admittedly, in the train of thought of "Being and Time" it initially sounded only like an increase in transcendental reflection, like reaching a higher level of reflection when time revealed itself as the horizon of being. The ontological lack of a basis of transcendental subjectivity, which Heidegger accused Husserl's phenomenology of, was indeed what seemed to be overcome by the reawakening of the question of being. What being means should be determined by the horizon of time. The structure of temporality thus appeared as the ontological determination of subjectivity. But it was more. >Subjectivity, >Subjectivity/Husserl. Heidegger's thesis was: Being itself is time. >Being/Heidegger, >Time/Heidegger, >Being, >Time._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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> Counter arguments against Heidegger
> Counter arguments in relation to Fundamental Ontology
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-29